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 ABSTRACT 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and its im-
plementing concept, Sea Based Logistics (SBL) stress the 
need for logistically supporting forces ashore directly from 
a sea base.  This study analyzes the capability of a current 
LHD-class amphibious ship to sustain a force deployed 
ashore through direct Ship-To-Objective Maneuver 
(STOM) of replenishment and logistics support.  We have 
developed a simulation model that can evaluate perform-
ance of STOM operations using an LHD-class amphibious 
ship as a sea base. Results indicate a substantial increase in 
the number of aircraft, and reliability of those aircraft, 
and/or a substantial reduction in sustainment requirements 
are needed in order to successfully accomplish the scenar-
ios used in this study.  The results of this study could sup-
port the design of future LHD-class ships. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to adapt to the changes in the strategic and techno-
logic environment following the end of the Cold War, the 
Marine Corps developed OMFTS (U. S. Marine Corps 
1996).  OMFTS targets the littoral regions of the world as 
the arenas where the most important conflicts of the future 
will occur.  Littoral regions are those areas characterized 
by great cities, well-populated coasts, and the intersection 
of trade routes where land and sea meet. Littorals provide 
homes to over 80 percent of the world’s capital cities and 
nearly all of the marketplaces for international trade. 
 
 OMFTS envisions rapid maneuver by assault forces 
from their ships directly to operational objectives ashore.  
Attacking objectives directly from the sea allows the Naval 
Commander to use the sea as maneuver space and turns the 
enemy’s coastline into a vulnerable flank rather than a bar-
rier to entry.  Under OMFTS the landing force is expected to 
create and maintain operational surprise, generate over-
whelming tempo, and overmatch enemy weaknesses with its 
power and rapid execution in order to keep the enemy off-
balance resulting in a quick, successful assault.  This re-
places the current amphibious methods of beach assault that 
require operational phases, pauses, and reorganizations that 
impose delays and inefficiencies on the operation. Ship-To-
Objective Maneuver (STOM) is one of the key implement-
ing concepts to achieve the operational goals established by 
OMFTS.  STOM defines the principles and tactics of forci-
ble entry from the sea.  Two key components of STOM are 
the tactical maneuver of forces and sea-basing. Historically, 
amphibious warfare sought to move forces ashore methodi-
cally from the ships onto a beachhead via a slow-moving 
shuttle system.  Forces would then expand out from the 
beachhead to seize intermediate and final operational objec-
tives.  However, this method was slow and restricted in its 
maneuver space and extremely vulnerable to enemy coun-
terattacks.  Until sufficient forces could be lodged ashore 
and begin to develop operational momentum, the assault 
force was in a precarious position. STOM seeks to change 
this ship-to-shore movement to amphibious maneuver.  The 
objective of STOM is to put combat units ashore either by 
air, surface or both means in fighting formation in sufficient 
force and in the decisive place in order to accomplish the 
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mission.  The capability to operate from over the horizon 
coupled with the ability to strike deep inland directly at cen-
ters of gravity will force the enemy to defend a vastly larger 
area and provide the attacking forces with tactical surprise 
(U. S. Marine Corps 1996 & 1997). 
The success of STOM and OMFTS hinges on the abil-
ity to effectively seabase the logistic functions of the assault 
force. Employing logistics directly from the ship to the ob-
jective will eliminate the requirements for beachheads.  This 
will eliminate the resulting operational pause while suffi-
cient supplies build up on the beachhead and also the need 
for dedicated shore-based force protection for the logistics 
area.  Additionally, expectations are that future battlefields 
will be characterized by coordinated speed of maneuver, in-
creased operating ranges, and precision delivery of massed 
effects.  Sea Based Logistics offers the unique capability to 
both sustain the future high optempo battlefield and exploit 
the advantages inherent in mobility and over the horizon 
standoff (U. S. Marine Corps 1998).  In this paper we evalu-
ate performance of STOM operations using an LHD-class 
amphibious ship (e.g., USS Bonhomme Richard, or USS 
Boxer) as a sea base to provide basic sustainment require-
ments (food, water, fuel, ammunition) to a Marine Expedi-
tionary Unit (MEU) under the OMFTS concept.  
2 SIMULATION MODEL 
We have developed several simulation scenarios with differ-
ent sizes of forces deployed, the number of aircraft, and the 
distance between the deployed forces and the sea base. The 
LHD can be considered as a floating distribution center.  
The ship replenishes its stocks via underway replenishment 
(UNREP) from supply ships.  See Figure 1 for a screenshot 
of vertical replenishment (VERTREP) simulation model de-
veloped in ARENA (Kelton et al. 2002).  Once a helicopter 
delivers pallets from a supply ship to the flight deck of the 
LHD, the pallets are disconnected from the helicopter.  Then 
a 4K forklift picks them up and travels to either a cargo ele-
vator or one of the deck edge elevators (aircraft elevators).  
This begins the “strike down” phase.  The pallets are then 
moved to different holds for storage. Ammunition pallets are 
separately handled and stored in ammunition storage. See 
Curtin (2001) for more details of the UNREP simulation 
model.  Once the UNREP process is complete the re-supply 
of the landing force will commence.   
2.1 Mission Types and Force Size   
We consider three different types of missions: (1) Humani-
tarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR), (2) Non-
combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), and (3) Enabling 
Force (EF).  Additionally, there are two different ammuni-
tion requirements depending on whether the Marines were 
assaulting an objective or sustaining their position:  an as-
sault rate and a sustainment rate of ammunition consump-tion.  Combining these two ammunition requirements results 
in five different scenarios:  HA/DR, NEO-Sustain, NEO-
Assault, EF-Sustain, and EF-Assault (Hagan 1998).  There 
are no ammunition expenditure for the HA/DR mission. 
These five scenarios were simulated over the three different 
distances between the deployed forces and the sea base:  50, 
100, and 150 miles. 50 miles are considered as the minimum 
distance for STOM from the sea base to a hostile shore when 
delivering assets via the air.  100 and 150 miles were chosen 
as round multiples of the minimum distance that would 




Figure 1: A Screenshot of VERTREP Simulation Model 
from a Supply Ship to an LHD-class Amphibious Ship  
 
In each of the five scenarios, a Marine Expeditionary 
Unit (MEU) has been delployed ashore.  The size of the 
MEU may vary from 400 to 1,500 personnel, depending on 
a mission type (see Table 1).  The landing force maintains 
two days of supply (DOS) and requests a re-supply when 
they reach one DOS. At 2000 hours deployed forces relay 
their resupply request to the sea base. Requested items are 
removed from holds, palletized (MRE and ammunition) 
and prestaged on the flight deck before the STOM opera-
tion starts in the morning.  This process is referred to as 
“strike up,” which is the reverse of “strike down.”  They 
also fill bladders with water and fuel on the flight deck.  
Beginning at 0700 the following day, helicopters begin to 
deliver  pallets and bladders to the troops ashore.  The op-
eration will last until 1900 or all requirements are deliv-
ered.  Undelivered items would be added to the following 
day’s delivery requirements.  More details of the airlift op-
eration will be described in the next subsection. 
 
Table 1: Mission Type and Force Size 
Mission Force size 
HA/DR 417 
NEO  651 
EF 1505 
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The daily quantity of each type of sustainment re-
quirement is based on the number and type of the forces, 
vehicles and equipment deployed ashore by the force 
commander.  This study uses current Marine Corps Logis-
tic Planning Factors (LPF) published in the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Data Library (1998).  Sup-
plies other than the four used in this study were considered 
not significant for the types of missions analyzed.  Table 2 
summarizes the daily requirements in pallets for food and 
ammunition, and bladders for fuel and water for each type 
of mission (Hagan 1998). Each bladder of water weighs 
4,650 pounds.  Each bladder of fuel weighs 3,685 pounds. 
A pallet of MREs weighs 1,100 pounds and an ammunition 
pallet, 2,200 pounds (Reitter 1999). 
 
Table 2:  Mission Daily Sustainment Requirements 




HA/DR 3 5 10 0 0 
NEO 4 8 10 7 2 
EF 8 19 20 29 7 
2.2 Aviation Assets 
The MEU Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is designated 
as a Composite Squadron.  It is normally built around a 
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) of 12 CH-46 
Sea Knights, a medium lift assault helicopter.  However, 
the CH-46 is scheduled to be replaced by the MV-22 Os-
prey and therefore the characteristics of MV-22 are used in 
the simulation model.  The HMM is augmented by four 
CH-53E Sea Stallions, three UH-1N utility helicopters and 
four AH-1W Sea Cobra attack helicopters, and six fixed-
wing AV-8B Harriers.  In this simulation model, we only 
use 12 MV-22s since other aircraft are used for combat or 
other heavy lift missions.   
The MV-22 is a tilt-rotor aircraft, which can take off 
and land vertically like a helicopter, then fly like an airplane.  
Using this technology, the MV-22 will be able to travel fur-
ther, at much higher speed and with a much larger payload 
than the CH-46.  The MV-22 has not been introduced to the 
fleet yet and has recently encountered programmatic diffi-
culties, but it is expected to be fully operational by 2010. 
MV-22 deliveries of cargo will be accomplished via external 
means because of constraints imposed by cabin dimensions 
and cargo floor weight limitations.  The speed of a MV-22 
carrying an external load is 167 knots. Unladen, the MV-22 
flies at 230 knots (Naval Studies Board  1999).  The external 
lift capability is shown in Table 3. The longer the mission 
distance the smaller the payload due to fuel consumption re-
quired for heavier lift.  We are assuming that the MV-22 re-
quires refueling if it has spent more than 4 hours on a lift 
mission before it begins a new one.  Table 3: Mission Radius vs. Cargo Payload.  Source (Frey, 
2000) 





Table 4 provides the maximum number of pallets or blad-
ders in the payload of a single MV-22 for each mission ra-
dius.  The actual number of pallets of each type of re-
quirement is based on the number and type of forces, 
vehicles, and equipment deployed ashore.  
 
Table 4: Mission Radius (in miles) vs. Maximum Re-
quirement Payload (in pallets or bladders) 
Dist. (miles) MRE Ammo Water Fuel 
50 10 5 2 3 
100 8 4 2 2 
150 6 3 1 1 
 
Over time, aircraft experience breakdowns and require 
maintenance.  This maintenance can be either routine, minor 
organizational-level maintenance or major AIMD (Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Department) maintenance requir-
ing an intermediate level capability to repair the aircraft.  
Under the OMFTS concept, the sea base is assumed to have 
the capability to perform all necessary maintenance. In the 
simulation model, we begin by assuming that 15 percent of 
the time the MV-22 requires maintenance after the aircraft 
returns to the sea base from a lift mission. This reliabil-
ity/maintainability figure probably is an overestimation al-
though no real data is available yet.  In the next section, we 
will show the sensitivity analysis by changing this 15% 
value. Of these 15% maintenance requirements, with 80% 
chance, an MV-22 will require minor maintenance action for 
an average period of 3 hours.  Major maintenance occurs 20 
% of the time (i.e., 3%, or 20% of the 15%, of all the return-
ing aircraft) and removes the aircraft from service for an av-
erage of 25 days. Data from air-capable amphibious ships in 
the NALDA database (July 2000 to July 2001) was used to 
estimate the average delay time.  While the average was 25 
days, there were many extreme values which could be due to 
the difficulty of obtaining materiel and spares during the de-
ployment. For example, data from the USS Wasp showed a 
range from five to 257 days of delay.  Because of the high 
variance in the data and the fact that the true distribution for 
major maintenance for the MV-22 is unknown at this time, 
an exponential distribution was used.  Due to the long 
AIMD delay for major maintenance, a failed aircraft is most 
likely removed from rest of the mission.  In the next section 
we conducted sensitivity analysis on the AIMD turnaround 
Kang, Doerr, Bryan, and Ameyugo 
 
time. As data becomes available as the MV-22 is introduced 
into the fleet, an analysis of the turnaround time should be 
revisited in order to improve the results of the model.  
2.3 Other Assumptions 
There are several additional assumptions that affect the simu-
lation model developed for this analysis. First, it is assumed 
that the enemy air defenses and air assets were neutralized 
prior to the insertion of the Marines.  Thus there is no attri-
tion to the MV-22s flying resupply missions due to enemy 
action in this simulation model.  Support for this assumption 
can be drawn from recent examples of United States 
intervention in Kosovo, Afghanistan and the Gulf War. 
Secondly, this analysis assumes the entire force has 
been deployed prior to the start of the resupply missions.  
Therefore, there is little requirement for aircraft to ferry 
personnel from the sea base to the shore.  This leaves all 
MV-22s initially available for resupply sorties.  Any re-
quirement for minor reinforcement or medical evacuation 
is assumed to be filled by the UH-1N utility helicopters.  
Lastly, it is assumed that the MEU forces that were 
deployed ashore did not secure any beachhead and are suf-
ficiently far enough away from any usable beaches to pre-
clude the use of any sort of surface transportation (e.g.,  
LCAG or any other lighterage) to deliver the sustainment 
requirements.   
3 SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Upon completion of the 15 different scenarios over a 15-
day mission, the daily delivery percentage was calculated 
for 30 replications.  Table 5 summarizes the average per-
centage of daily requirements delivered for the last 5 days 
of the 15-day mission.  The final portion of the mission is 
the most critical, since aircraft maintenance requirements 
will have the heaviest impact at that time. Undelivered por-
tion would be added to the following day’s requirements 
Also recorded in the simulation, but not reported in 
this paper, is the time that the last pallet of each of the four 
commodities was delivered each day.  This is done so that 
on the days when 100% delivery is achieved a measure of 
aircraft utilization for that day could be extracted from the 
model.  There are other measures recorded as well: the 
number of MV-22 sorties, the number of aircraft requiring 
AIMD maintenance, and the number of aircraft requiring 
minor maintenance.  The detailed results are available in 
Bryan (2001). 
These results indicate that the size of the force, which 
determines the quantity of sustainment requirements, and 
the distance between the deployed forces and the sea base 
are the key that determined whether or not success was 
achieved for the missions. The pattern of failure begins 
with the NEO mission (assault rate) at 150 miles.  Analysis 
of the simulation results from this mission indicates that it 
Table 5: Mission Delivery Summary (percentage of 
daily requirements delivered for days 11 to 15) 
Mission Days (last 5 days) 
Mission Dist. 
11 12 13 14 15 
50 100 100 100 100 100 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
HA/DR 
 
150 100 100 100 100 100 
50 100 100 100 100 100 




150 100 100 100 100 100 
50 100 100 100 100 100 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
NEO-
assult 
150 100 98 96 93 93 
50 100 100 100 99 90 




150 61 58 48 44 47 
50 97 99 95 98 100 
100 93 91 88 81 91 
EF-
assault 
150 51 40 33 33 29 
 
is the distance and the resulting increase in importance of 
the aircraft availability that results in mission failure.  The 
largest mission force package, comprised of 1500 Marines, 
is the Enabling Force – assault rate.  Missions with an as-
sault rate of ammunition consumption added an additional 
22 pallets of ammunition (a total of 29 pallets versus 7 for 
the sustainment rate) which require more sorties. Also 
longer mission radius requires more sorties since less load 
can be transported in a single sortie as shown in Table 3.  
The longer flight times imply that fewer sorties can be 
flown during a give time period.   The longer flight times 
and lesser payload capabilities make the availability of the 
aviation assets more important.  Removal from the mission 
due to maintenance requirements also takes on greater im-
portance in determining the success of the mission.  For 
these reasons, the number of available aircraft also is a key 
for success or failure of the various missions.   
Failure of each of the Enabling Force missions at all 
distances indicates that the quantity of sustainment re-
quirements that must be delivered exceeds the sea base’s 
ability to deliver them.  Additionally, the incidence of fail-
ure occurs earlier as the distance between the forces and 
the sea base is increased since more sorties are required.  In 
some cases, the delivery percentages of Day 15 are higher 
than those of earlier days.  This is probably due to aircraft 
reliability and maintenance. 
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4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
For the sensitivity analyses conducted in this section, only 
one input parameter was changed at a time while all others 
were held constant. The AIMD maintenance delay effec-
tively removes the affected aircraft from the rest of the simu-
lation because of the long turnaround time.  By increasing 
the number of initial aircraft, the effects of this delay should 
be lessened because more aircraft will still be in an opera-
tional status. To test the sensitivity of the model, the Ena-
bling Force (assault rate) mission at 150 miles was used as 
the test scenario.  The total number of aircraft was increased 
incrementally until the Enabling Force (assault rate) mission 
at 150 miles was successfully completed while all other in-
put parameters were held constant. The minimum number of 
MV-22s required to successfully complete this mission is 
27, i.e., 15 more aircraft.  The number of sorties required to 
complete the mission was 714.   
Next we change the maintainability requirement fac-
tors.  The probability of maintenance requirement after re-
turning to the sea base was steadily decreased until the 
most rigorous mission (Enabling Force/assault rate/150 
miles) was successfully completed, while all other parame-
ters were held constant. We also changed the percentage of 
AIMD maintenance requirement was reduced until the 
mission was completed successfully.  The results of both 
analyses indicate that if no more than 1% (vs. 3% for the 
base scenario) of the aircraft returning from the delivery 
mission, are sent to the AIMD repair, they can successfully 
achieve the mission goal.    
Another way to increase the operational availability is 
to reduce cycle time by providing better logistics support.  
For instance, additional spare parts can be added to the in-
ventory of the units maintaining the aircraft to reduce the 
turnaround time for the AIMD maintenance.  Or the capa-
bility of the AIMD can be increased or expanded to im-
prove the AIMD’s ability to quickly return aircraft to ser-
vice. Another way to improve operational availability is to 
reduce to the turnaround time for AIMD maintenance.  The 
average AIMD maintenance delay was decreased incre-
mentally until the Enabling Force (assault rate) mission at 
150 miles was successfully accomplished.  The distribution 
remained the same – exponential distribution.  The result 
indicates that the AIMD turnaround time should be re-
duced to 2 days from 25 days to accomplish the mission.  
The two day turnaround time for the deployed AIMD may 
not be realistically achievable, yet this sensitivity analysis 
reemphasized the importance of maintenance turnaround 
time for the higher operational availability of aircraft.  
5 CONCLUSIONS  
The current LHD-class ship is capable of sustaining forces 
deployed ashore only under OMFTS concepts for a limited 
time or a limited distance. The proposed complement of 12 MV-22 aircraft for a LHD-class ship is insufficient to ac-
complish all required sustainment missions with the given 
sustainment requirements and maintenance factors as-
sumed in this study.  Sensitivity analysis indicated that ac-
complishing the most extensive mission requirements 
would require significant changes in 1) the number of air-
craft available, 2) reliability of MV-22, and/or 3) the 
AIMD maintenance delay.  
Another way to accomplish the most extensive mis-
sions would be to reduce sustainment requirements.  Fuel 
and water requirements are the most difficult requirements 
to transport, but also provide the most promise for realizing 
reductions (e.g., more fuel efficient trucks).  
Improvement in any of these areas requires major in-
vestment.  A more comprehensive study must be done be-
fore implementation. These situations need to be addressed 
in order to ensure a LHD-class ship or any future ship de-
signed to accomplish operational missions with OMFTS 
concepts to ensure the forces deployed ashore can be prop-
erly sustained. 
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